What considerations feed into the decisions made, and who makes them?

This is an introductory guide to understanding foreign policy.

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Foreign Policy (FP) analysis is the study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system.

FP is a black box, where decisions are made behind closed doors between the ruling executives, foreign ministers, diplomats, intelligence, and think tanks. The reasons for this are manifold:

·       the public mostly uses heuristics to judge international events

·       international relations are seen as too complex for the average voter to understand and influence

·       it would take impractically long to ask voters for their opinions

·       the realm of international relations is privy to a lot of sensitive and security information

·       voters may not understand the long-term nature and nuances of the diplomatic relationships, etc.

Thus, voters are limited in their involvement in foreign policy. As a result, international considerations are also typically not a large factor in voting.

The first step of FP analysis is usually establishing whether decision-makers are rational or irrational, as it is very difficult to analyse anyone who is not acting in a logical way (given the circumstances andlimitations). After this has been established, we look at the schools of thought and provide you with the key considerations of FP decision-making.

Schools of Thought

These don’t always contradict each other. I think it is more helpful to see them as frameworks of analysis rather than mutually exclusive theories.

Here are 5 key ways of how to understand foreign policy. Depending on the Zeitgeist and circumstances, some may be more prevalent than others.

The organisational behaviour & bureaucratic politics theory examines the clashes of interest and perceptions of different arms of government. It primarily attributes the behaviour of decision-makers to the structure of the institution by disaggregating the state into factions. This can be reduced to the aphorism: “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Miles Law), allowing us to analyse the influence of the bureaucracy. What we see often however is that the decision-making elite is fairly centralised and homogenous, while opposition at a lower level of government is often inconsequential.

Decision-making can also be understood using the Cognitive School of thought. Hereby leaders use the cognitive economy: brief frameworks, historical analogies and heuristics to simplify complex situations. For example, western leaders often use the disastrous consequences of the appeasement of Hitler (Munich Agreement of 1938) as a mental shortcut to decide to aggressively interfere with potential so-called ‘rogue actors’. The cognitive school also entails the notion of bounded rationality: a rationality that is restricted by cognitive limitations, restrained by the type of information and time to make a decision.

Constructivism and Historical Analogies theories refuse the notion of bounded rationality and argue that rationality is structured by the nation’s own society. It analyses decisions in terms of national identity, thereby attributing most decisions to enhancing ideational power. Leaders may create an idea of their nation and perpetuate their own interpretation of history – and of what is historically justifiable. It creates a moral, almost seductive certainty and reasoning behind FP decision-making.

Liberalism is not simply the ideological notion of classical liberalism, it carries some of its basic principles.While realist frameworks (below) see moral aspirations as far less important, liberalist theories often incorporate such. Proponents of liberalism assume states act like rational individuals, but in stark contrast to realist theories, believe that the self-interest of states is the peaceful and prosperous co-existence above all.

Other key liberal arguments include the following:

• - Democratic peace theory: evidence supports the idea that democracies don’t go to war with other democracies because they share similar value systems and institutions, which make their behaviour more predictable.Thus one might argue, that if you want a peaceful world, as Fukuyama writes, best increase the number of liberal democracies. If this was achieved, the peaceful coexistence would be ‘the end of history’. Critics point out that while democracies do co-exist more peacefully among each other, they don’t with non-democracies. Much evidence points to this ideology becoming inconsistent and self-corrupting, reminding us to cautiously reflect on the illusory notions embedded in the ideas of ’never negotiate with terrorists’ and ’the war to end all wars’.‍
• - Liberal institutionalism argues that states become rule-abiding actors of supranational institutions, thereby creating a more peaceful and prosperous world. This taps into a similar line of thinking to realists, who argue that the lack of a greater authority to protect oneself is the reason for international animosity. Liberal institutionalists argue that these institutions create a hierarchy that can bring about more peace. Much evidence points out that these institutions are not really supranational, but typically under the control of the prevailing hegemon, creating the illusion of a ‘rules-based order’, but only as long as it suits the main power(s).‍
• - Economic interdependence theory states that similar to the idea of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977), i.e. that the connectedness and interaction between states leads to a higher probability of peaceful and mutually beneficial resolution of conflict.

However, for both liberal institutionalism and economic interdependence theory, the survival instinct i.e. maximising one’s power trumps the need for states to abide by supranational rules (institutionalism) or trust in achieving mutual prosperity (economic interdependence) – i.e. essentially resulting in the prisoner’s dilemma.  

Realism is the dominant framework for understanding foreign-policy decisions. Realism is solely based on interests and power. There are two primary schools of realism.

1. 1. Classical realism i.e. human realism argues that the basis of decision-making is found in human psychology - individual human beings are hard-wired with an “animus dominandi” (Morgenthau).
2. 2. Neo-classical realism i.e. structural realism argues that the architecture of the system makes decision-makers behave aggressively. Because there is no power ‘above them’, one can never be sure that another state won’t come after you.

While these two theories are based on different sources, the result is the same: leaders are always incentivised to maximise power.

The predominant neo-classical realism framework stresses the rationalist deliberations the administration collectively went through and assesses the political and diplomatic risks, balancing them against their interests. Realists, particularly structural ones see the problem inherently in the anarchical structure of states, which leads decision-makers to ‘eat, or be eaten’. Throughout time, people have organised themselves into tribes, kingdoms, states etc. to avert this desructive nature of anarchy. In an international system, the lack of hierarchy leads states to pursue maximum power. In the pursuit of power, leaders are expected to go through a cost/benefit analysis with a prolonged risk assessment.

• ‍- Defensive realists focus on the balance of power and believe that maintaining that is the driver for international decisions. Countries should thus maintain their power and the balance of power. What stops states from gaining more power is the international structure, which will punish you if you expand your power.‍
• - Offensive realists believe thatthe international structure is not capable of punishing expanding power andthat countries continually seek more power as it is the best way to defendagainst becoming the victim.

Proponents of liberalism on the other hand argue that humans and by extension states are incentivised by more than just those primal instincts of power.

Now that we understand the reasons behind great power struggles, let's look at factors that impact international decision-making.

FP decision-making considerations

How foreign policy is made is opaque, to say the least. However, there are some mental rules to keep in mind that usually hold true.

Consider the size of a power, which is not just the physical size, but consists of the labour force and economic development, which is usually directly related to military power.

In short:

• - large powers do what they want‍
• - middle powers seek interests through order and predictability (making them really more like smaller powers)
• - small powers do what they have to (are told)

The nature of the political system also has an impact on how decisions are made and how countries view each other:

• - separation of power, such as direct democracies
• - ‘elected dictatorships’ with large majorities in the house, typically representative democracies or republics
• - coalition government
• - dictatorships

States with a similar political system can potentially be more capable to understand and predict each other’s behaviours.

The cohesiveness of a state

Whether or not a decision-maker is representative of the population as a whole directly relates to how coherent their decisions tend to be. Likewise, countries that are fractured – often multi-nation states – do not tend to be governable by a democratic structure. For example, the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916 drew straight arbitrary lines into the dissolving Ottoman empire, splitting nations, languages, cultures etc., establishing hard-to-govern countries such as Iraq. Creating borders between states that are cohesive and where the government is representative of all of the population is foundational to a more congruent FP and relations.

Domestic and International Arena

Foreign policy rarely has just something to do with the external. Many FP decisions are internally focused. Particularly where a leader does not cohesively represent the people of their country, the executive may use foreign policy to consolidate its power by for example going to war; known as the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect. FP decision-making is not just driven by an anarchical international system, but by potential anarchy at home. Think about Saddam Hussein’s decision to lie about having weapons of mass destruction. Despite the risk of aUS invasion, he felt the dangers of being domestically seen as weak overshadowed the insufficient caution he exercised towards external threats.

Public opinion is malleable and elastic; it can change in a heartbeat, as we have seen for example during the ‘Blair-doctrine’, when Tony Blair's increadibly quickly lost his almost unprecedented popularity. It is also evident that mainstream media mostly follow authority and their dependent experts, as opposed to critically questioning such. Only once there is a discourse and disagreement among the authorities do the mass media tend to diversify their outcries and emphasize those differences. Very little of what you read in mainstream media regarding foreign relations has anything to do with reality - the real ‘untold’ story runs in the background. The mass media can be objective and accurate on some topics, foreign relations is likely the least accurately reported one of them all, regardless of where.

Outcomes, particularly those stemming from a poor decision-making process tend to be completely disconnected from the FP decision itself, reminding us of the adage Günther Anders articulated in ‘The Nuclear Threat’ (translated): ‘The stupidity of a decision is directly correlated to the extent of its unforeseen consequences’.

You can use these frameworks to understand how the often incomprehensible international decisions are made, what the likely considerations leaders made were, and whether those were based upon an appropriate and adequate assessment.

FP Instruments

We finish off with a brief mention of how policy is executed. States have various instruments to convince other states to do what they want. Diplomacy starts with a relationship and a demand.

Steps:

1. 1. Articulate your demand
2. 2. Create some kind of urgency
3. 3. Permeate the belief that the coercing power is highly motivated. Think about a street fight type of situation, where you’ll find that the one that will win is the one that is more determined and has less to lose.
4. 4. Create a fear of unacceptable escalation. Tools of escalation include:
   1. a) positive sanctions (incentives)
   2. b) negative sanctions (punishment)
   3. c) military action (worst punishment)

While sanctions have proven to be ineffective in toppling governments, they increase negative consequences and can cause a tit-for-tat type of escalation.

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This is just an introduction, a guideline for you to better understand what is going on in the world. I hope you find it useful.